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ABSTRACT
Intrusion Detection and/or Prevention Systems (IDPS) represent an important line of defence against a
variety of attacks that can compromise the security and proper functioning of an enterprise information
system. Along with the widespread evolution of new emerging services, the quantity and impact of attacks
have  continuously increased, attackers continuously find vulnerabilities at various levels, from the network
itself to operating system and applications, exploit them to crack system and services. Network defence and
network monitoring has become an essential component of computer security to predict and prevent
attacks. Unlike traditional Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
(IDPS) have additional features to secure computer networks.
In this paper, we present a detailed study of how deployment of an IDPS plays a key role in its
performance and the ability to detect and prevent known as well as unknown attacks. We categorize IDPS
based on deployment as Network-based, host-based, and Perimeter-based and Hybrid. A detailed
comparison is shown in this paper and finally we justify our proposed solution, which deploys agents at
host-level to give better performance in terms of reduced rate of false positives and accurate detection and
prevention.
KEYWORDS
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1. INTRODUCTION
In order to apply admission and access control for a network, various Intrusion Detection
and Prevention systems (IDPS) are available in the market. Intrusion detection system is used to
manage traffic in real-time for increasing the accuracy detection and decreasing false alarm rate.
In some instances, IPS adopts techniques from intrusion detection, such as detection approach,
monitoring sensor, and alert mechanism. An IDPS is also used for gateway appliance, perimeter
defence appliance, all-in-all capability, and network packet inspection/prevention. It is designed
to identify and recognize potential security violations in stream network. However, the primary
intrusion prevention use signature mechanism to identify activity in network traffic and host
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where perform detect on inbound – outbound packets and would block that activity before they
access and damage network resources.
Fig.1 and Fig. 2 shows the basic scenario of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and an
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).
Fig.1     Intrusion Detection System
Fig.2     Intrusion Prevention System
An IDPS is an inline approach to monitor network activity. The detection technique used by the
IDPS classifies it into two categories: signature based if it detects an attack by comparing it
against a stored set of pre-defined signatures. It is anomaly-based if any abnormal behavior or
intrusive activity occurs in the computer system, which deviates from system normal behavior.
System normal behavior such as kernel information, system logs event, network packet
information, software-running information; operating system information etc is stored into the
database [1]
The deployment of an IDPS categorizes it as host-based or network-based.  In addition,
when deployed around the boundary of a network, it is known as perimeter-based IDPS. A
distributed deployment of IDPS, wherein certain tasks are handled at the host-level and remaining
at the network-level is known as hybrid IDPS. In this paper, we present a case study on the above
mentioned techniques of deployment of existing IDPS, including problem areas faced in today’s
environment and enhancements possible to address each of these problem areas.
2. RELATED WORK
The primary deployment of IDPS is either at network level or at host level. The deployment
determines the basic characteristics of an IDPS, which is then known as network-based IDPS
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(NIDPS) or host-based IDPS (HIDPS). In an NIDPS, an IPS sensor is usually placed at network
ingress point. The IPS sensor monitors network traffic and inspect packet transmissions for
suspicious behaviour. A network-based system can be used to provide detection for multiple hosts
by locating the monitoring component appropriately (at a network ingress point, for example).
HIDPS operate on single hosts, and operate on low-level system data, such as patterns of system
calls, file access, or process usage. They can monitor for suspicious behaviour, or they can scan
configurations to detect potential vulnerabilities using techniques such as port scan. Fig. 3 shows
the deployment using HIDPS.
Fig.3 Host-based IDPS
Nowadays, the host-based approach plays a more prominent role than a decade ago. First,
modern operating systems have grown in complexity, driven by the explosive growth of the
Internet, thus it is more difficult to achieve an extensive monitoring. Secondly, system
administrators are usually concerned about the impact of an HIDS on host performance. A
notable HIDS (it is usually called a “web application firewall”) is ModSecurity [9]. It is a module
(i.e., a pluggable software component) for the Apache web server. ModSecurity intercepts
incoming requests, runs the analysis and, in case a request is considered suspicious, can drop it,
thereby preventing the request from being processed by the Apache instance.
The main advantage of the NIDS approach is the possibility to monitor data and events
without affecting host performance. On the other hand, the fact it is not host-based turns out to be
one of the main disadvantages (especially for systems analysing the payload of network packets).
For instance, a NIDS cannot function properly in combination with applications or application
protocols which apply data encryption (e.g. SSH and SSL), unless the encryption key is provided.
A possible solution to this makes use of a host-based component to access data after decryption,
but this causes an overhead on the monitored host. This problem is going to grow in importance
since now IPv6 is gradually replacing IPv4: in fact, one of the main design goals of IPv6 is the
authentication and confidentiality of data (through cryptography). Fig. 4 shows deployment using
NIDS.
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Fig.4 Network-based IDPS
Another common problem for a NIDS is the reconstruction of network traffic. Data
streams are split into TCP segments and IP datagram. In order to analyse the content, the system
needs to reassemble the traffic into the original form. Modern networks operate at high speed (up
to 10Gbs): while the traffic reconstruction would be theoretically possible for an arbitrarily
powerful system, a NIDS faces performance and implementation constraints. First, the NIDS
must save a significant amount of data for a long time, depending on system time-outs and data
throughput (this is resource consuming). Secondly, operating systems implement heterogeneous
network stacks and handle data reconstruction differently. Therefore the NIDS engine should
implement some context-awareness functionalities. All of these limitations resulted in the so-
called evasion and insertion attacks, formalised by Ptacek and Newsham [10]. Attackers craft
communications to fool the NIDS, e.g., by overwriting inside NIDS memory some data
previously sent or by forcing the NIDS to drop data (that has not been analysed yet) after
sometime.
The EMERALD system [3] attempted to merge the advantages offered by both the HIDS
and the NIDS approaches into (virtually) single IDS. The problems of data normalization from
different sources, event fusion and correlation and suitable metric definition are still open issues.
These problems stopped the development of improvements after the first proof of concept of
EMERALD.
There are further two types of NIDPS. Promiscuous-mode network intrusion detection is
the standard technique that “sniffs” all the packets on a network segment to analyze the behavior.
In Promiscuous-mode Intrusion detection & prevention systems, only one sensor is placed on
each segment in the network. Network-node intrusion detection and prevention system sniffs the
packets that are bound for a particular destination computer. Network-node systems are designed
to work in a distributed environment [13].
In order to detect and prevent maximum number of attacks, we need to capture data that
is distributed spatially and temporally. For example, an attack detected at different monitoring
locations can be a distributed attack. Also, same attack that is detected during different time
intervals gives an indication of co-ordinated, automatic attack. To capture data spatially and
temporally, we require a hybrid system, which incorporates centralized monitoring feature of
NIDPS and localized, distributed feature of HIDPS.
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.5, No.2, March 2013
107
3. COMPARISON OF NIDPS AND HIDPS
This section describes deployment considerations to be taken while deploying an IDPS. We have
studied few host-based and network-based deployment and show details of each with pros and
cons. Host-based IDSs have certain advantages when compared with network-based intrusion
detection systems. One advantage is that HIDSs can access semantically rich information about
the operations performed on a host, whereas NIDSs that analyze network traffic have to
reassemble, parse, and interpret the application-level traffic to identify application-level actions
[10]. This is even more evident when application-level traffic is encrypted. In this case, a
network-based monitor has to be equipped with the key material needed to decrypt the traffic;
otherwise, the application-level information is not accessible. In addition, the amount of
information that HIDSs have to process is usually more limited, because the rate at which events
are generated by the OS and applications is smaller than the rate at which network packets are
sent over busy links. A third advantage is that HIDSs are less prone to evasion attacks because it
is more difficult to desynchronize the view that the intrusion detection system has of the status of
a monitored application with respect to the application itself. Finally, a host-based intrusion
detection system has a better chance of performing a focused response because the process
performing an attack can sometimes be easily identified and terminated.
One of the more popular host-based intrusion detection and prevention systems is
Hawkeye solution. [2] The architecture of Hawkeye solution proposed in [2] includes components
such as sensors/agents, management server, database server, console and demilitarized zone
(DMZ). This solution scores over other HIDPS by providing features such as capturing packets
organized by TCP or UDP threads, passively monitoring network, packet viewing and logging in
hex-format, detection of abnormal packet on comparison with benchmark ones and stating cause
of abnormality. In case of abnormality, the source IP address can be traced. However, the basic
detection methodology is packet-based. If an attack is distributed across multiple packets, it
cannot be detected. Therefore, detection should be stream-based or data-based but not individual
packet-based.
Another problem of Hawkeye solution is discussed [3][4]. It says that network flow
identification should be done in such a way that every packet is monitored. To address this
problem, an adaptive sampling algorithm is proposed. This algorithm predicts future behavior
based on observed samples. It utilizes the weighted least squares predictor to select the next
sampling interval. Inaccurate predictions by the weighted least squares predictor indicates a
change in the network traffic behavior and requires a change in the sampling rate.
On the other side, this algorithm only looks for trends in network traffic and can detect
few attacks such as DOS attacks. When we deploy detection system on host, an IDPS that
monitors network activity can only measure trends in network traffic and thus detect attacks such
as DOS.
A major trend found nowadays is co-existence of IPv4 and IPv6 networks. This is
because the depletion of IPv4 addresses space. Due to the massive investment in IPv4, network
and established lots of applications, and IPv6 networks need to be gradually perfect and
recognized; the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 will be a very slow process [5]. The CIDP [5] is a
proposed multi-level, distributed, three-dimensional architecture of intrusion detection and
prevention. It consists of UTM (Unified Threat Management) for network-based intrusion
detection and prevention systems UTM NIDP at the network boundary, the network-based
intrusion detection and prevention systems Subnet NIDP in each subnet, Host-based HIDP, host-
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based mobile users HIDP in IPv6/IPv4 IPSec tunnel endpoint, host-based intrusion detection and
prevention systems HIDP composition in the public domain server DMZ. The subnet NIDP
incorporated in one of the three layers, detects back door attacks. Subnet NIDP protects other
subnets from the host, which launches an attack, but the subnet itself is still vulnerable. For this
protection, we require host-based IDPS. This proposed architecture [5] deploys HIDPS only on
certain endpoints. Rather the deployment should be done on each host, since it protects the
network not only from server-side attacks but also from client-side attacks.
Without NAT, the IPv4 address space would have been exhausted a long time ago.
However, the translation of address/port by NAT affects different other applications  since
applications behind the NAT have no way to know what the real address/port used by the hosts
[14,15].Whenever an attack is generated from within the network or a host is being victimized in
the network, IP address of both attacker and victim is necessary.  For this, IDPS must be re-
examined to perform correctly with NAT. When an IDPS is deployed on a perimeter router,
which is behind NAT device, we lack actual identity of attacker and victim. IDPS deployed in the
network must be aware about the presence of a NAT device that changes the packets headers. [6]
One of the solution to this [6] deploys two IDPS: one deployed above the NAT and another below
the NAT, so these two systems will refer attacker and victim with different identities even if they
alert the same attack, so these two alerts will be considered as two different alarms which
increases the number of alerts and overwhelm the security operator. Identification module
analyzes output of the analysis module to determine the real hosts’ identities that are implicated in
the security issue based on the NAT table.
To integrate IDPS to NAT box is tough and not every NAT device may provide such
information outside the box. If we deploy IDPS functionality on a host, then the attacker and
victim information will always be correct.
In case of wireless networks, because of some characteristics network, it is not so
convenient to build an IDPS in wireless environment as in wired environment. For example, a
company’s trusted workers may need “inside” kinds of connectivity while using wireless devices.
Inversely, visitors may need “outside” kinds of connectivity while connecting to the company’s
wired network through an access point inside the corporate firewall. It is very hard to place a
firewall between “inside” and “outside”. [16]
Secondly, the IDPS engine should be placed in sole path of user’s traffics. But attacks on
a wireless network can come from all directions and target at any node. Therefore, it is not easy to
find a sole path to place an IPS engine that all traffic must pass.
Therefore, it is difficult to build an IPS engine in wireless environment as in wired
networks. In order to address this issue, WBIPS (WTLS-Based IPS) model has been described
[7]. In this mode, a logical sole path is built between every wireless terminal and its destination,
so an IPS engine can detect and prevent the traffics of user.
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Fig. 5. Wireless Setup
VPN tunnel should be created between wireless device and gateway. The traffic should be re-
directed through the tunnel. If we deploy HIDPS on wireless device, tunneling will not be
necessary.
4. CONCLUSION AND THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to detect and prevent maximum number of attacks, we need to capture data that
is distributed spatially and temporally. For example, an attack detected at different monitoring
locations can be a distributed attack. In addition, same attack that is detected during different time
intervals gives an indication of co-ordinated, automatic attack. To capture data spatially and
temporally, we require a hybrid system, which incorporates centralized monitoring feature of
NIDPS and localized, distributed feature of HIDPS.
Fig.6 Typical Deployment of Proxy Server in Local Network
If someone wants to implement above-mentioned approach then it can better implemented
using our work. As we have explained that implementing, it at edge router level might lead
chances to run into a situation of false positives due to wrong operative frequency calculation. If
the same can be implemented at host level then one can find out operating frequency of services
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easily using our Application Aware Logger System. Using our system one can get the hold on
application data also to determine if the request is coming from proxy server as whenever any
proxy server sends a request on behalf of any host we can find out actual host using “X-
ForwardedFor” tag in request header. Using this parameter, we can implement operating
frequency of concurrent connection in a better way.
Figure 8. Implementation of Network Interceptor
In our proposed hybrid system, we have developed a module called Network Interceptor
[16], which works to access real-time application data. It is shown in Figure 7. It captures socket
calls using layered service provider of Winsock control and obtains all application related
information and socket information. It monitors the data sent or received from each application
using Suricata for attack detection and prevention. If any malicious activity has been found then it
generates the event for the same, which includes not only source and destination information of
connection but application information also like name of the application, version of the
application, etc. For distributed monitoring, we have deployed a Logging agent in our hybrid
system on each host. The logging agent captures events and sends the event information using
UDP protocol, to Event Collector [17], which stores the log in database. Figure 8.shows how
event collector works.
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Figure 8: Role of Event Collector
First, we are using rule-set of Suricata, which is an IDPS used widely nowadays. From
the existing rule-set of Suricata, we have taken two sets: Web-client and Web-server rules. Since
our proposed system is designed taking into consideration corporate environment, we have
classified the rule-set into further four categories:
1) Server-side Inbound.
2) Client-side Inbound.
3) Server-side Outbound.
4) Client-side Outbound.
This categorization is because an attack can be launched from within the network or from
outside the network. In a typical network, there are two types of applications running: Client
application and Server Application. Whenever a client application in the network requests for any
service outside the network, it may become vulnerable to attacks from servers running outside the
network. In addition, when any service provided by a Server application within the network is
requested by an outside application, it may also launch an attack on server application. Apart
from this, any vulnerable or infected application, client or server can possibly make attacks, to an
application outside the network.
4.1 CLIENT-SIDE ATTACK
When any client accesses any service from server, there are high chances that an attack
can be launched on client by the program running on remote server. This attack would generally
be client specific. It is due to any known vulnerability of specific client version. We can
categorize all such rules under Web-Client rules category and classify this type of attack as client-
side attack. The client –side attack can be inbound as well as outbound depending on the direction
of connection.
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A. Outbound Attack (Inside Client being victimized): In this scenario, TOMCAT
server is hosted on the internet. One of the desktop machines tries to access site hosted on the
TOMCAT using Internet Explorer. If this site or server is being compromised then it can launch
an attack on the internet explorer application. One such type of attack is “Possible Microsoft
Internet Explorer URI Validation Remote Code Execution Attempt”. If the version running of
Internet Explorer is vulnerable to this attack then it is being victimized by such an attack. Our
logging agent inspects the data and logs the event. The following diagram shows the actual
working of the same:
Fig 9: Client-Side Outbound Attack
B. Inbound Attack (Inside server attacking on outside client): In this scenario, TOMCAT
server is running in our network. Some client from the internet tries to access the site using
Internet Explorer. If our server is infected or compromised, then it can launch an attack on the
remote client’s IE. Our logging agent detects this attack and sends the log to central event
collector. Event collector then stores this information into database. As it is the case of attack
being generated within the network, so collector also adds this record into quarantine database. So
in future, we can quarantine such infected applications running within the network.
4.2 SERVER-SIDE ATTACK
When anyone requests any service from the server, he can also land an attack along with
the request. If running application server has any known vulnerability, services can suffer due to
attack. We can have categorized all such rules under Web-Server rules category and classified
this type of attack as server side attack. Again, depending on direction of connection, attack can
be inbound as well as outbound.
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A. Outbound Attack: A server is hosted on the internet. One of the desktop machines in
our network tries to launch a DOS attack using an NKiller2 application. This application launches
TCP Zero window attack on to remote server which is DDOS attack and due to that service gets
interrupted. Our logging agent inspects this data, identifies an attack, and sends this data to event
collector. Event collector stores this event log into database. Since it is an attack, which being
generated from within the network Event collector also stores information into quarantine
database.
Fig.10: Server-Side Outbound Attack
\
B. Inbound Attack: In this case, TOMCAT server is running in our network. Client tries
to attempt directory traversal on our server. Our logging agent logs event related information of
such attacks and sends a log to central collector.
5. EVENT LOGGING FOR ADMIN USE
As described in previous section, logging agent with the help of network interceptor and Suricata
inspects traffic to check whether exploit has been found. If found then agent sends an event to
central event collector. This event log majorly identifies four different kinds of events. Inside
client being victimized, Inside server being victimized, Inside client is attacking and Inside server
is attacking. In case of attack generated by inside client or server collector also, add application
related information like version, application name, and name of the attack into quarantine
database. Administrator can also choose to apply any new security hot-fixes to application if
available. As mentioned before we are using Suricata in our solution. Following is a brief
description of how Suricata is used by our Event logger.
6. SURICATA
Our IDS logging agent inspects the data with the help of Suricata. Suricata is an open-source IDS
available on all the platforms. It identifies an attack based on pre-defined signature rule-set.
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Logging agent sends data along with application and connection information to Suricata.
Therefore, Suricata does not need to track the connection for TCP Reassembly. After
vulnerability scanning, IDS logging agent receives result back from Suricata. Result includes
information about attack if detected along with its severity.
Suricata uses standard rule-set available from emerging threats. To achieve full security IDS
signature rule-set has to be up to date. The logging agent contacts the administration server to
check availability of new signature in the signature database. If new signature is found, logging
agent also updates Suricata with new signature.
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